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Environmental Plaintiff Standing and
Extraterritoriality in The Endangered
Species Act: Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife*
INTRODUCTION
Motivated by a concern for accelerated species extinction
around the world, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 (ESA)', its express purpose being the preservation and
protection of endangered species.' One of the most crucial and
controversial provisions of the ESA is section 7, which declares
the intention of Congress to protect "any" endangered and
threatened species against "any action" taken by "any" federal
agency.3 Section 7 of the Act requires each federal agency to
consult with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to
ensure that any agency action is unlikely to jeopardize endan-
gered species. 4 An important question is thus raised concerning
* Subsequent to the finalization of this issue, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit's decision in this case. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 60 U.S.L.W. 4495
(U.S. June 12, 1992) (No. 90-1424). The Court held Defenders lacked standing because
they failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. Thus the Court of Appeals erred in denying
summary judgment for the United States Government.
I Endangered Species Act of 1973 [hereinafter cited as ESA], as amended, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
2 Henry J. Blum, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 13 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 129, 129 n.4 (1987) [hereinafter Blum
Note] (citing S. REP: No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.A.A.N.
2989).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (as amended, 1988) (as cited in John C. Beiers, Comment,
The International Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 176 n.23 and accompanying text (1989)).
4 Section 7 (a)(2) provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an 'agency action')
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species ....
Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
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the scope of section 7 of the Act itself: Do the requirements for
consultation apply to federal agency actions taken in foreign
countries? 5
In 1978, the Secretary of the Interior interpreted section 7
as having extraterritorial application and as requiring agencies
to consult with the Secretary concerning actions in foreign coun-
tries concerning their actions.6 In 1986 the Secretary attempted
to eliminate this extraterritorial interpretation by revising the
rule to limit the consultation requirement to agency actions in
the United States or on the high seas.7
The validity of the 1986 regulation has been directly chal-
lenged and has made its way to the Supreme Court in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife." This comment tracks the progress of the
Defenders case and examines the two issues it brings before the
Supreme Court: 1) Do the plaintiffs have standing to challenge
the regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior which
interprets the statutory obligations of federal agencies under
Section 7(a)(2), when they have not challenged any specific ac-
tion by an agency upon which the statutory obligations actually
fall?; and 2) Is the Secretary's construction of Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA as being inapplicable to federal agencies' activities in
foreign countries consistent with the Act? 9
I. LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Envi-
ronment and the Humane Society of the United States (Defend-
John C. Beiers, Comment, supra note 3, 29 SANTA CLARA L. RaV. 171, 176
(1989).
The 1978 regulation provides:
Section 7 applies to all listed species of fish, wildlife, or plants . .. [and]
requires every Federal agency to insure that its activities and programs in
the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign countries will not
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species.
50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1978) (emphasis added).
7 The 1986 regulation provides:
Section 7(a)(2) of the Act requires every Federal agency, in consultaion
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, to insure that any action it
authorizes, funds, or carries out, in the United States or upon the high
seas, is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species.
50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1987).
1 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F.Supp. 43, (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, 851
F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), on remand, 707 F.Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 911
F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, - U.S.
__. Ill S.Ct. 2008, 59 U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. May 14, 1991) (No. 90-1424).
9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 59 U.S.L.W. 3763, 3763-64 (U.S. May 14,
1991), granting review, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
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ers) first brought their action in district court challenging the
Secretary of the Interior's 1986 regulation as invalid on its face
and contrary to the provisions of the ESA.'0 The failure of the
regulation to require consultation on foreign federal agency ac-
tion, as alleged by Defenders, increases the rate of extinction of
endangered species in foreign countries." Defenders asserted the
new regulation threatens, imminently and irreparably, its and
the public's interest in the continued application of section 7
and related sections 12 of the Act to agency action abroad.' 3
According to Defenders, the Secretary violated a statutory duty
to conserve endangered species 4 whose primary ranges 5 are in
foreign lands.
16
Defenders provided affidavits showing the existence of spe-
cific agency projects in foreign countries that increase, or threaten
0 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F.Supp. 43, 45 (D. Minn. 1987).
Id. at 46.
2 Under section 4 of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 1533) and the regulations promulgated
in accordance with that section, the Secretary determines whether any species is endan-
gered or threatened. Once a species has been listed as an endangered or threatened
species (section 1533(c)) or has been proposed to be listed (section 1536(a)(4)) the
consultation provisions of section 7 become applicable .... Blum Note at 13 CoLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 129, 130 n.13 and accompanying text.
'1 Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Environment v. Hodel,
851 F.2d 1035, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 1988).
" Section 4(b)(1)(A) of the Act provides:
The Secretary shall make determinations required by subsection (a)(l) of
this section solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available to him after conducting a review of the status of the species and
after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State or
foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, pro-
tection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation practices, within
any area under its jurisdiction, or on the high seas.
(B) In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall give consideraton to
species which have been-
(i) designated as requiring protection from unrestricted commerce by
any foreign nation, or pursuant to any international agreement; or
(ii) identified as in danger of extinction, or likely to become so within
the forseeable future, by any State agency or by any agency of a
foreign nation that is responsible for the conservation of fish or wildlife
or plants.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
11 "[Als of May, 1989, of 1,046 species listed as endangered or threatened, 507
were species whose range is outside the United States. In addition, there are 71 listed
species whose range includes both United States and foreign territory. " Defenders of
Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Environment, et. al. v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117,
123 (8th Cir. 1990).
" Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1038.
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to increase, the rate of species extinction.' 7 These projects include
the Mahaweli River Basin Project in Sri Lanka and the Aswan
Dam Project in Egypt.' 8 Defenders' members stated they had
visited these projects in the past to observe and study the wild-
life, and planned to visit these sites in the future to continue
their studies.' 9
Eight endangered species are found in the Mahaweli Project
area: the Indian elephant, the leopard, the purple-faced languar,
the togue macaque, the red-faced malkoha, the Bengal monitor,
the mugger crocodile, and the python.30 Anne Skilbred, a mem-
ber of Defenders, visited the Mahweli Project site in order to
observe its wildlife and animal habitat, and stated she planned
to revisit the site in the future for the same purposes.2' Similarly,
Joyce Kelly, President of Defenders, visited the Aswan Dam
Project and planned to do so in the future.2 2 The Bureau of
Land Reclamation has a nine year commitment to aid in the
rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam, a site which is a habitat
for the endangered Nile crocodile. 23 Defenders contended that
without the required consultation, the adverse impacts of agency
projects would not be given full consideration, thus injuring
Defenders by threatening the very species they are studying."
Defenders sought declaratory and injunctive relief by requesting
the court to direct the Secretary to perform the duties it owed
to them; specifically, to publish, forthwith, regulations requiring
federal agencies to consult on agency actions abroad that might
affect endangered species.25 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota dismissed the case on the basis that De-
fenders lacked standing because it did not sufficiently allege an
injury-in-fact, traceable to the Secretary's regulation and redress-
able by a favorable decision.
2
1
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, con-
cluding that Defenders had sufficiently supported the standing
requirements for both substantive and procedural injuries, by
17 Defenders, 658 F.Supp. at 47.
11 Defenders, 911 F.2d at 120-21.
9 Id.
Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1041.
" Defenders, 911 F.2d at 120.
2 Id.
2, Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1041-42.
Id. at 1041.
I /d.
Defenders, 658 F.Supp. at 47-48.
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alleging that the Secretary's interpretation of section 7 of the
ESA increases the rate of extinction of the endangered and
threatened species its members had visited at federal agency
projects in foreign countries.
2 7
On remand, the district court denied the Secretary's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of standing. The court based
its ruling on the fact that the Eighth Circuit's decision on this
issue, in the Secretary's earlier motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, did not vary the situation enough to merit a different
analysis. 2 The court then entered summary judgment for De-
fenders and ordered the Secretary to rescind the 1986 regulation
and issue regulations that would apply the consultation provi-
sions of the ESA to federal agency action in foreign countries.2 9
The court held the plain meaning of section 7 of the Act required
each federal agency to consult with the Secretary regarding agency
action that might affect any endangered or threatened species,
including actions in foreign countries. 30 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed on both the standing issue and the extra-
territorial issue, finding the extraterritorial requirement in the
plain words of the statute. Accordingly, the court showed no
deference to the Secretary's construction of the Act.3'
The Supreme Court granted review to the Secretary's petition
for Certiorari on May 14, 1990.32 The issues slated for argument
Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1040.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F.Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Minn. 1989).
Id. at 1086. The court ordered as follows:
The Clerk shall enter the judgment as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Secretary of
Interior shall:
1. Revoke and rescind so much of 50 C.F.R. Part 402 (1987) as limits the
consultation requirement of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1536, to federal agency action that may affect endangered or
threatened species in the United States or on the high seas;
2. Publish, within thirty (30) days ... of this judgment, proposed regu-
lations clearly recognizing the full mandate of section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, expressly and affirmatively requiring that each federal agency
consult with the defendant Secretary with respect to any agency action that
may affect any endangered or threatened species, wherever found;
3. Publish, within sixty (60) days ... of this judgment, final regulations
clearly recognizing the full mandate of section 7 of the Endangerd Species
Act, expressly and affirmatively requiring that each federal agency consult
with the defendant Secretary with respect to any agency action that may
affect any endangered or threatened species, wherever found.
" Id. at 1084.
31 Defenders, 911 F.2d at 123-25.
" Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub.
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before the Court on December 3, 1991 were: 1) Whether res-
pondents, Defenders, have standing to challenge the regulation
issued by the Secretary of the Interior which merely interprets
the statutory obligations of federal agencies under Section 7(a)(2),
when they have not challenged any specific action by an agency
upon which the statutory obligations actually fall?; and 2) Is the
Secretary's construction of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act as inapplicable to federal agencies/activities in for-
eign countries consistent with the Act?3
II. Do THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING?
A. Previous Standing Decisions
Standing for environmental plaintiffs has been generally and
liberally allowed since the 1970s Supreme Court cases of Sierra
Club v. Morton34 and United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).5 These decisions set
relatively inclusive standards, requiring only simple allegations
that plaintiff organizations or their members use the land or
resources affected by agency action. 6 In the 1990 case Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, however, the Supreme Court narrowed
Morton's and SCRAP'S inclusive approach by requiring more
specific pleading of substantive injury.
a7
In Defenders, the Eighth Circuit applied the National Wild-
life guidelines and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations were
"specific enough" in light of this recent decision.3" Additionally,
Defenders also found standing for the plaintiffs' procedural
injury claim by finding that the ESA itself conferred a correlative
procedural right of consultation to the plaintiffs.3 9
nom, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 59 U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. May 14, 1991) (No. 90-
1424).
" 59 U.S.L.W. 3763, 3763-64 (U.S. May 14, 1991).
'" Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel
851 F.2d 1035, 1040 (1988) (citing Morton as requiring plaintiff to allege that its members
are those who use the environmental area, and who will be adversely affected).
35 SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, (1973). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel 851 F.2d
1035, 1040 (1988) (citing .SCRAP and Morton).
Katherine B. Steuer and Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental
Plaintiffs: Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation., 15 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 187, 194 (1991). (hereinafter Steuer and Juni, Note].
17 _ U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
m Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 120-21 (8th Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 121-22.
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The following sections on standing seek to show where the
Eighth Circuit's treatment of substantive and procedural stand-
ing "fits" with these previous standing decisions, and discusses
what the Supreme Court might consider in reviewing standing
in Defenders.
B. Injury in Fact for Plaintiffs' Standing
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal
courts to actual "[c]ases [and] [clontroversies. ' 4" The Eighth
Circuit's examination of the standing issue in Defenders was
guided by the following fundamental principle:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art[iclel III requires the party
who invokes the court's authority to [1] "show that he per-
sonally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,"
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
* . . (1979), and [2] that the injury "fairly can be traced to the
challenged action" and [3] "is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 . . . (1976).41
In the first appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that Defenders
had met the requirements for traceability (causation) and re-
dressability. 42 The Secretary did not challenge these elements
of standing on remand; and so the court did not address them
in the second appeal. 43 The court also held when these require-
ments have been legislated into the statute itself by Congress,
as was the case with the ESA,4 4 plaintiffs will readily meet
- U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4 Defenders, 911 F.2d at 119 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)).
4" Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1041-44.
41 Defenders, 911 F.2d at 119.
" The purpose of the Endangered Species Act is to provide the means to conserve
the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend. 16 U.S.C. § 1531
(1988).
Section 7(a)(2) is designed to meet that purpose by ensuring that the impact of a
federal agency action on endangered or threatened species will be given full consideration.
Section 7(a)(2) states that "[elach Federal agency shall confer with the Secretary on any
agency action which is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species
proposed to be listed under section 1533 [section 4 ESA] of this title .... " Id. at
§ 1536(a)(2). If this consultation requirement is not met, endangered species and hence
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them.4 1 Since these issues of standing are not of immediate
focus in the upcoming Supreme Court's review, the focus here
is on the injury-in-fact requirement for plaintiff standing.
The Eighth Circuit found Defenders sufficiently alleged in-
jury in fact on two grounds: substantive and procedural.4 De-
fenders' substantive injury was that governmental agencies' failure
to consult with the Secretary about their projects' harmful effects
on foreign species would result in an increase of the rate of
extinction of endangered species in foreign countries.4 7 That, in
turn, would result in harm to its members who had visited those
countries to observe those endangered species. 48 The procedural
injury resulted from the Secretary's refusal to carry out the
"statutorily mandated [consultation] procedure." 49 The body of
law from which the Defenders court draws these conclusions
includes the "backbone" cases of environmental plaintiff stand-
ing. 0 Defenders cuts a significant place among those prior cases.
1. Substantive Injury in Fact
Regarding the substantive injury, the Eighth Circuit assessed
Defenders' standing status under the rules set forth in the "clas-
sic" standing cases of Sierra Club v. Morton," United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),52
and the more recent Supreme Court case Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n .53
Regarding an organization like Defenders, the Morton court
held that an injury or threatened injury to an interest in aes-
plaintiff are threatened with harm (i.e., causation is inherent in the statute). Thus,
Congress has determined that a remedy for Defenders' injury is consultation with the
Secretary. A ruling that the 1986 regulations requiring consultation for agency projects
in foreign countries will likely redress Defenders injury (i.e., redressability is established
in the statute itself).
41 Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1043.




SO See Steuer and Juni, Note, supra, note 36, at 194.
11 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel
851 F.2d 1035, 1040 (1988) (citing Morton as delineating the requirements for standing).
52 U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, (1973). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel 851 F.2d 1035, 1040 (1988) (citing
SCRAP as the basis for standing).
5" Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
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thetic, conservational, and recreational values is considered a
substantive injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing, pro-
vided the plaintiff organization alleges that its members use the
area and will be adversely affected.54 In Morton, the Sierra Club
was challenging Walt Disney's plans to develop the Mineral King
Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The Court denied stand-
ing to the Sierra Club finding that the organization failed to
assert that its members used the Mineral King Valley, thus they
were not materially injured by any change in the aesthetics and
ecology of the area.
5
The Sierra Club had deliberately omitted from its complaint
any allegation that its members had been injured in fact, because
they sought a way to challenge environmental degradation wher-
ever it might occur.5 6 The Supreme Court found this goal of
environmental action far too policy-oriented and directly con-
trary to the traditional injury indicia of Constitutional stand-
ing.17 In fact, the Court stated "[nlowhere in the pleadings or
affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral King
for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that
would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the
respondents.""8
In SCRAP,5 9 plaintiffs challenged the approval of railroad
freight rate increases, claiming such increases would discourage
the shipment of recycled goods, thereby increasing the use and
waste of natural resources.60 The Court held SCRAP had stand-
ing because its "members used the forests, streams, mountains,
and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for
camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that this use was
disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the
nonuse of recyclable goods brought about by a rate increase on
those commodities." 61 SCRAP applied the Morton analysis to
find "that the plaintiffs had asserted the 'specific and percepti-
"Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
" Id. at 734
-6 See Morton, 405 U.S. at 735-36, n. 8; and at 740, n. 15. See also Steuer and
Juni, Note, at 193 n. 37 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 3-16, 117-
18 (2d. ed. 1988)).
Steuer and Juni, Note, at 193 n. 37.
" Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Steuer and Juni, Note, at 193.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 685, quoted in Steuer and Juni, Note, at 193.
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ble' harm necessary to distinguish their interests from a gener-
alized interest in natural resources . . . as a whole.''62
While Morton and SCRAP set the stage for environmental
plaintiff standing, they espouse relatively inclusive standards,
requiring only simple allegations that plaintiff organizations or
their members use the land or resources affected by agency
action.63 Indeed, the SCRAP Court observed that "all persons
who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all
who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by
the environmental groups here." In 1990, the Supreme Court
retreated from these liberal standing rules.
65
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n narrowed the standards of
Morton and SCRAP by requiring specific allegations of harm.6
National Wildlife involved a challenge by the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) of the "land withdrawal review program" of
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).67 The NWF alleged
that the director of the BLM had violated the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)" and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA), 69 through its administration of
the "land withdrawal review program. '"70 The NWF provided
affidavits claiming use of land "in the vicinity" of vast tracts
of land affected by the BLM's decisions regarding classifications
and revocations of withdrawals. 7 1 The Court held these affidavits
Id. at 689, quoted in Steuer and Juni, Note, at 193.
61 Supra note 47m at 194.
- SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687, quoted in Steuer and Juni, Note, at 193.
65 Steuer and Juni, Note, at 194. (referring to Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n.,
__ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)).
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh'g denied,
844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir., on remand, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.
Ct. 834, rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990)(hereinafter Lujan v. NWF).
67 id. at 3182.
" Federal Land Policy and Management Act [hereinafter cited as FIPMA], Pub.
L. no. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (codified in provisions scattered through U.S.C.
Titles 7, 16, 30, 40, and 43 (1988)).
National Environmental Policy Act [hereinafter cited as NEPAJ, Pub. L. No.
91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1988)).
,0 Id. at 3183-84.
7 According to Lujan v. NWF, plaintiff Peterson's affidavit averred:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly
those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have been
and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of
the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the South Pass-Green Moun-
[VOL. 7:273
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were insufficient to confer standing because it remained unclear
whether plaintiffs actually used the lands or resources adversely
affected by the BLM's "land withdrawal review program."
72
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the allegations in Defenders
from the insufficient ones in National Wildlife:
In National Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that the allega-
tions in the Peterson affidavit claiming use of the land "in the
vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming," were in-
sufficient to defeat summary judgment on standing. This claim
was not specific enough because only 4500 acres of the two
million acre area were affected by the challenged action. The
Erman affidavit was similarly deficient because it claimed use
of land "in the vicinity" of the Grand Canyon, Arizona Strip,
and the Kaibib National Forest. Of the 5.5 million acres of
the Arizona Strip, only one-third were actually affected by the
challenged action .... [T]he evidence here [in Defenders] spe-
cifically identified the land areas visited which were the sites
of the challenged agency actions. [Plaintiff] Skilbred stated
that she visited the Mahaweli Project site in Sri Lanka ....
[Plaintiff] Kelly stated that she had observed the traditional
habitat of the Nile crocodile at the Aswan High Dam project
in Egypt.
73
In Defenders, the Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme
Court's retreat from the inclusive standards of Morton and
SCRAP by applying the mandate of National Wildlife in closely
scrutinizing the specific allegations in deciding whether the in-
terests of the plaintiffs were "actually affected." 7 4 The upcoming
Supreme Court review of Defenders should reveal whether De-
tain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of mining claims
and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and
wildlife habitat potential of these lands.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3187.
Plaintiff Erman's affidavit was substantially the same as Peterson's except
in regard to the area involved; he claimed use of land 'in the vicinity of
Grand Canyon National Part [sic], the Arizona Strip (Kanab Plateau), and
the Kaibab National Forest.'
Id.
I Id. at 3189.
11 911 F.2nd at 121 n.2 (citations omitted).
Steuer and Juni, Note, at 205.
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fenders' allegations were specific enough. The ultimate result
will be either a halting of the National Wildlife Court's narrow-
ing of standing requirements, by granting Defenders standing,
or, a requirement of even greater specificity for environmental
plaintiffs' pleading, by denying Defenders standing.
1. Procedural Injury
As for their procedural injury, Defenders alleged the Secre-
tary's refusal to carry out a statutorily mandated consultation
procedure constituted sufficient injury-in-fact to confer stand-
ing.7 The Secretary's failure to follow the consultation proce-
dure created a risk that serious agency actions would not be
brought to the attention of the decision makers. 76 Defenders was
injured because the Secretary ignored a procedural requirement
central to implementing the purposes of the ESA.
77
In the first Defenders appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted var-
ious courts of appeals had held that agency violations of pro-
cedural rights constituted injury-in-fact. t In determining whether
a given statutory duty created a correlating procedural right, the
court in the second appeal looked to the statutory language,
purpose, and legislative history of the ESA and found sufficient
support for procedural injury standing.
79
In examining these statutory categories, the court found the
language of the citizen suit provision of the ESA, 0 the Act's
enunciated purposes,8' and past Supreme Court interpretations
" 851 F.2d at 1040.
" Id. at 1042.
77 Id.
"1 Id. See Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986) (environ-
mental groups had standing to challenge Department of Interior's alleged violation of
NEPA provision requiring public input on oil and gas exploration recommendations
report when failure to do so would result in overlooking of environmental concerns in
agency decision); Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 491 (9th
Cir. 1987) (procedural defects in environmental impact statement (EIS) preparation create
risk that environmental impacts will be overlooked and constitute injury in fact); Munoz-
Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 428 (1st Cir. 1983) (failure to make allegedly man-
datory study is procedural error).
9 911 F.2d at 121-22. See Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 1988)
(In determining whether a given statutory duty creates a correlating procedural right,
courts look to the statutory language, purpose and legislative history.).
'o See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
The purpose of the Endangered Species Act is to provide the means to conserve
the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)
(1988). Section 7(a)(2) is designed to meet that purpose by ensuring that the impact of
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of the Act's legislative history, 2 as supportive of Defenders'
standing for procedural injury. 83 According to the Defenders
court, the 1986 regulation violated the language and intent of
the ESA and therefore injured Defenders because it allowed
agency actions in foreign countries to proceed without the req-
uisite consultation with the Secretary of the Interior.14 The lack
of consultation impeded the very objectives of the ESA; and
failure to follow the consultation procedure created a risk that
serious and avoidable environmental consequences of agency
actions would not be brought to the attention of the decision
makers. 5 According to the court, Defenders was "procedurally"
injured by elimination of the consultation procedures through
the 1986 regulation.
6
While the Defenders court focused on the statute as the
source of procedural injury, another circuit required a different
standard for procedural injury standing. The Eighth Circuit
refers to City of Davis v. Coleman, in which the Ninth Circuit
specifically required a "geographical nexus" test in addition to
a statutory procedural right for plaintiffs to obtain procedural
injury standing. 7 In Coleman, the court granted standing to the
City of Davis when it asserted procedural injuries resulting from
the failure of federal and state agencies to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS), as required under NEPA, before
commencing construction of a freeway interchange near Davis.8
The court stated:
The procedural injury implicit in agency failure to prepare an
EIS ... is itself a sufficient "injury in fact" to support
standing, provided this injury is alleged by a plaintiff having
a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the challenged
a federal agency action on endangered or threatened species will be given full consider-
ation. Section 7(a)(2) states that "[elach Federal agency shall confer with the Secretary
on any agency action which is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species
proposed to be listed under section 1533 [section 4 ESA! of this title. Id. at
§ 1536(a)(4).
12 "[Tlhe plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows
clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 'incalculable."' Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).




911 F.2d at 121 (citing City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Coleman, 521 F.2d at 665-66.
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project that he may be expected to suffer whatever environ-
mental consequences the project may have.89
The Defenders court rejected the Secretary's contention that
plaintiffs are required to establish a geographical nexus to the
project sites in order to establish a procedural injury. 9° The
Eighth Circuit was persuaded that geographical nexus did not
establish procedural injury, rather the Act imposes duties on the
Secretary that create the correlative procedural rights. Invasion
of those procedural rights is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement for standing.9' In reviewing Defenders the Su-
preme Court should have an opportunity to indicate whether it
wants to focus strictly on the statutory sources of procedural
injuries, or to retain and clarify the geographical nexus test.
C. Summary for Plaintiff Standing
The Defenders plaintiffs alleged both substantive and pro-
cedural injuries. The substantive injury was that plaintiffs sus-
tained harm by the potential increased rate of extinction of the
endangered species that they studied in foreign lands; such injury
resulted from the Secretary's 1986 elimination of the consultation
requirement for federal agencies conducting projects in foreign
lands. The procedural injury resulted from the Secretary's refusal
to carry out the statutorily mandated consultation procedure to
ensure adverse affects on endangered and threatened species
abroad would not be ignored.
Concerning substantive injury for standing, the Defenders
court found the plaintiffs alleged, specifically enough, facts re-
garding "actual effects" of the project sites where endangered
species will be potentially threatened; plaintiff's therefore dem-
onstrated sufficient injury for standing. The court's finding com-
ports with the recent Supreme Court framework set forth in
National Wildlife, which reflected a narrowing in the allowance
of standing to environmental plaintiffs compared to the broad
and inclusive standards in the Morton and SCRAP decisions.
The Defenders court specifically focused on statutory lan-
guage and intent as the source of a correlative procedural right,
the infringement of which would be sufficient to confer standing
upon the plaintiff. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit discarded the
''geographical nexus" test.
" Id. at 671.




Ill. EXTRATERRITORALITY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Eighth Circuit's finding of extraterritorial application
for the ESA92 in the language of the statute itself is a rare
occurrence for environmental statutes. 93 Courts have consistently
applied a presumption against extraterritoriality for environmen-
tal statutes in absence of a clearly expressed statement of con-
gressional intent to the contrary.9 The Defenders court found
sufficient proof in the language of the statute to rebut this
presumption, and decided section 7 of the ESA applied extra-
territorially."
A. Statutory Analysis
The Eighth Circuit found congressional intent for extrater-
ritorial application of the ESA in section 7 by applying the
definitive two-part test of Chevron v. NRDC:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions[:]
[11 First, always, is the question of whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambig-
uously expressed intent of Congress....
(2] [1If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.9
Focusing on the text of section 7(a)(2) itself, the Defenders
court found:
Reduced to its simplest form, the statute clearly states that
each federal agency must consult with the Secretary regarding
any action to insure that such action is not likely to jeopardize
the existence of any endangered species.9 7
11 Endangered Species Act of 1973 [hereinafter cited as ESA], as amended, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
" See Jonathan Turley, "When In Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 N.W. LAw REv. 598, 627 (1990).
" Id. at 602.
" 911 F.2d at 125.
911 F.2d at 122. (citing Chevron U.S.A., v. Natural Resources Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)),
" Id.
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The court acknowledged that focusing on the all-inclusive lan-
guage of section 7, however, was not itself "determinative of
the issue.""8 The court examined other sections of the ESA. It
concluded that the plain language of the Act revealed congres-
sional intent to extend the consultation requirement to all agency
actions affecting endangered species, whether within the United
States or abroad; therefore, no deference to agency interpreta-
tion was mandated. 99 For the court, the legislative history rein-
forced this conclusion.'m° Since the Secretary's 1986 regulation
was contrary to the specific intent of Congress, no deference
was due to the agency's construction of section 7 under appli-
cation of the Chevron rule, and the district court's order for
reversal of the regulation was affirmed on this basis. 10'
8. Extraterritoriality in Other Environmental Statutes.
A court's finding of support for extraterritorial application
of an environmental statute in the language of the statute itself
is rare. 0 2 Courts consistently deny extraterritorial application as
inherent in environmental statutes. 03 In United States v. Mitch-
ell, for example, the court held criminal prohibitions of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)' °4 did not reach con-
duct in the territorial waters of a foreign nation. 0 The court
found that the MMPA was "a conservation statute, designed to
preserve marine mammals."' 16 In Mitchell, the defendant was
charged with violating the MMPA by capturing twenty-one dol-
phins within a three-mile limit of the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas. Although Congress has the power to control the con-
duct of American citizens in foreign countries, the court stated
such an intent for extraterritorial application must come from
the statute itself.1° Applying precisely the same reasoning, the
Defenders court did find that the ESA mandates extraterritorial
" Id. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (5th Cir. 1977).
911 F.2d at 125
Im Id.
Id.
,' See supra notes 87-8 and accompanying text.
o Id.
, Marine Mammal Protection Act [hereinafter cited as MMPA], Pub. L. No. 92-
522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (codified in praovisions scattered in U.S.C. Title 16 (1988)).
,o, United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1977).
10 Id. at 1002.
1w Id. at 1001-02.
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application, 1' 8 and seems to run counter to many courts' reluc-
tance to find intent for extraterritoriality. The Defenders court
indicated that under appropriate statutory language and circum-
stances, the presumption might be overcome.
The Defenders court's finding of congressional intent, and
statutory language and history sufficient to support a finding of
foreign applicabilty, is not wholly inconsistent with other cases
that have limited NEPA to a domestic scope only.'09 NEPA and
the ESA are similar in that both are procedural statutes which
impose duties upon federal agencies to consider the environmen-
tal effects of their actions. As in section 7 of the ESA, the
mandate on federal agencies in NEPA is also all-inclusive: All
agencies of the federal government shall prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions affecting
the quality of the human environment. 1"0 In order to gain insight
into the impact of the Eighth Circuit's extraterritorial applica-
bility holding in Defenders, the extraterritorial application of the
consultation requirement of the ESA might be compared to
NEPA procedures as they have been considered in the courts.
In Greenpeace v. Stone, a second case, the plaintiff organi-
zation challenged the Army's failure to prepare an EIS for the
removal of chemical munitions from Germany to United States
territory.' The removal was based on a Presidential agreement
between the United States and West Germany."' The extrater-
ritorial application of NEPA, was denied finding that application
to actions in foreign countries would gravely conflict with for-
eign policy objectives, since the West German government had
reviewed and approved the removal."' The court pointed out,
however, that its "decision [was] limited to the specific and
unique facts which [were] present[ed] .... In other circum-
stances, NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS
for actions taken abroad .... ,, 4
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commn. questioned whether NEPA should be applied to
IN 911 F.2d at 122-23.
IN See Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749, 758-59 (D. Hawaii 1990); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345,
1365-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"- 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (1988).
Greenpeace, 748 F.Supp. at 754.
I, d. at 749.
1 Id. at 761.
" Id.
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the NRC's granting of a permit to export a nuclear reactor to
the Phillipines."lS Plaintiffs argued that NEPA required the com-
mission to prepare an EIS before licensing exportation of the
reactor."6 Although the challenged agency action in this case
would have a possible indirect effect upon the Phillipines, the
court held against the application of NEPA because of the
foreign nation's interest at stake. " 7 As in Greenpeace, the NRDC
court was careful to comment that "[we] find only that NEPA
does not apply to NRC nuclear export licensing decisions - and
not necessarily that the EIS requirement is inapplicable to some
other kind of major federal action abroad.""1
8
Both Greenpeace and NRDC deny extraterritorial application
of NEPA in their particular circumstances, but limit this to the
facts, and thus leave open some fact situations where NEPA
may be applied extraterritorially." 9
Regarding NEPA, while the courts have been unable to find
clear legislative intent, they have generally assumed NEPA does
apply extraterritorially. 20 Additionally, once plaintiffs establish
NEPA applies on one ground, some courts have found them
entitled to raise other inadequacies in the agencies EIS based
upon public interest. This inference has led courts to assume
NEPA applies extraterritorially for the specific foreign environ-
mental impacts involved.'21
Compared to the NEPA decisions, Defenders is unique be-
cause extraterritorial application is found not from the circum-
stances or outcome of the case alone, but in the actual intent
and language of the environmental statute itself. In comparison
"I Natural Resource Defense Fund, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647
F.2d 1345, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16 Id. at 1355.
' Id. at 1357.
"iId. at 1366.
"' See Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance With NEPA Amid the Cur-
rent Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENvTra. Asi. L. REv. 543 (1991) for
detailed discussion of extraterritorial application of NEPA.
I" Id. at 564.
2 See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 391-2 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (In action
to enjoin United States participation of highway construction in Panama due to alleged
deficiencies in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, the court acknowledged that
the effect of construction on local Indians raised the question of the foreign applicability
of NEPA, and parties submitted briefs on the question. Since the government did
adequately discuss the impact of construction on the Indians, however, the court merely
assumed, without deciding, that NEPA is fully applicable to construction in Panama,
leaving resolution of "this important issue" to another day.).
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to past court interpretations, Defenders stands out as a victory
for environmentalists. The Defenders court found, within a stat-
ute, protection for the global environment. This reaches beyond
the traditionally review-shielded regulatory actions of agency
officials, usually accorded great deference.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife may become a definitive case
for environmental plaintiff standing. If affirmed on the standing
issue, it will serve as an example of the greater specificity in
pleading necessary to allege substantive injury. Morton remains
just above the bare minimum baseline requirements of SCRAP,
as far as environmental standing is concerned. Under Morton,
plaintiffs cannot bring suit without at least a threat of injury;
whereas SCRAP finds injury can be alleged from a tenuous
chain of causation. Since the recent National Wildlife decision
heightens the scrutiny for injury, Defenders will either stand as
an example of this recent refinement of the required specific
pleading of "actual affect" and injury through plaintiffs' use
of the land and resources (species) affected; or it will fall as
non-specific allegations insufficient in the eyes of the Supreme
Court.
Ifthe procedural injury standing is affirmed, more pressure
may be placed on federal agencies to promulgate regulations
tracking more closely the statutory language involved-a definite
boon to environmentalists. The Eighth Circuit rejected the geo-
graphical nexus element of procedural injury standing, focusing
solely on the statutory source of the procedural injury. This
could damage environmental plaintiffs if, despite a geographical
nexus to the agency action, the statute could defeat a procedural
injury, where the statute does not sufficiently establish a correl-
ative-procedural right. The Supreme Court should take the op-
portunity to indicate whether it wants to focus strictly on the
statutory sources of procedural injuries, or to retain and clarify
the geographical nexus test.
The Eighth Circuit has decided the Defenders case against
an agency decision. By finding extraterritorial application in the
ESA itself, the court foreclosed the application of step two under
a Chevron review of an agency's statutory construction. Such a
finding is rare for an environmental statute, and stands to be a
victory for endangered species and for the environment if upheld
by the Supreme Court; the protection will be etched into the
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statute itself rather than left at the mercy of agency interpreta-
tion. Finally, since environmental dangers are themselves blind
to national boundaries, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife could be
a step in the right direction toward a more global application of
our environmental statutes.
Timothy A. Clark
